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THE REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR THROUGH MULTILATERAL MEANS A SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

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PREFACE

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The opinions contained in the papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute and its Board of Directors.

David Cox, from Queen's University, Steve Lee from CIIPS, and James Sutterlin, of the Yale University International Security and Arms Control Program, participated in the preparation of this report.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The participants in this conference at Kingston, Ontario, came together to explore new ways of reducing the risk of war. They emphasized multilateral mechanisms, and especially the involvement of the United Nations.

Discussion ranged from the broadly theoretical -- defining the types, nature and causes of conflict -- to the specific, technical details of various possibilities for risk reduction machinery. Ways of preventing conventional war were considered under the topic of a multilateral risk reduction centre. The peculiar problems posed by the danger of nuclear war were addressed during discussions of a multilateral nuclear alert centre.

In order to be effective in the role of war prevention, the Security Council, and the Secretary-General in particular, will need rapid access to reliable information. One agency for this type of data gathering may be the newly formed Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI).

Participants acknowledged that many of the world's worst conflicts stem from economic and social tensions that are traditionally considered to be part of the state's internal affairs and therefore beyond the reach of UN intervention. Are there ways for the UN to monitor and perhaps ameliorate these societal tensions before they erupt into a broader conflict? This is a contentious area because it challenges the sovereignty of the individual nations.

International peacekeeping is often criticized for creating a holding pattern that allows the adversaries to avoid the resolution of their conflict. Perhaps some way could be found to develop a form of preventive peacekeeping and, more importantly, proactive peacemaking initiatives.

CONDENSÉ

Les participants à cette conférence qui a eu lieu à Kingston (Ontario) ont cherché ensemble de nouvelles façons de réduire les risques de guerre. Ils ont mis l'accent sur les mécanismes multilatéraux, et surtout sur l'intervention des Nations-Unies.

La discussion a porté tantôt sur des détails techniques particuliers des divers mécanismes possibles de réduction des risques et tantôt sur des sujets théoriques (définir les types et les causes de conflit, ainsi que la nature des conflits). Dans le cadre de la discussion sur la création d'un centre multilatéral de réduction des risques, les participants ont examiné des moyens de prévenir la guerre classique. Quant aux problèmes particuliers que pose le danger d'une guerre nucléaire, ils ont été abordés pendant un débat sur l'établissement d'un centre multilatéral d'alerte nucléaire.

Afin d'être efficaces dans leurs efforts pour prévenir la guerre, le Conseil de sécurité, et le Secrétaire général en particulier, devront avoir rapidement accès à de l'information fiable. Le bureau de la recherche et de la collecte d'information, qui vient d'être formé, pourrait se charger de recueiller ce genre de renseignements.

Les participants ont admis que bon nombre des pires conflits dans le monde découlent de tensions socio-économiques qu'on a toujours considérées comme relevant des affaires internes d'un pays et comme n'étant par conséquent pas du ressort de l'ONU. Existe-t-il des moyens pour celle-ci de surveiller l'évolution de ces tensions sociales et de les atténuer avant qu'elles dégénèrent en des conflits plus vastes? C'est là un sujet litigieux, car l'idée remet en question le principe de la souveraineté des États.

On critique souvent les opérations internationales de maintien de la paix en disant qu'elles favorisent un attentisme dans lequel les adversaires se cantonnent pour éviter de résoudre leurs différends. On pourrait peut-être trouver un moyen de mener des opérations «préventives» de maintien de la paix et, ce qui est plus important, d'amorcer des initiatives dynamiques d'établissement de la paix.

INTRODUCTION

In October 1988 United Nations experts, academics, and international public servants met in Kingston, Ontario, to consider what expanded role the United Nations might play in war prevention.

Over the course of two days they reviewed some recent international conflicts, the risks of both regional conflict and nuclear war, the role of the UN in risk reduction, the nature of peacekeeping, the value of regional war risk reduction centres, the feasibility of a multilateral nuclear alert centre, and the communications needs of the UN in general and the office of the Secretary-General in particular.

The conference on the Reduction of Risk of War through Multilateral Means was hosted by David Cox of Queen's University, with funding provided by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. James Sutterlin, representing the Yale University International Security and Arms Control Program, acted as programme chairman.

The Kingston conference brought together a wide range of participants representing different academic disciplines, political and administrative experiences and national viewpoints. Participants included the Soviet deputy foreign minister, Vladimir Petrovsky; West Germany's ambassador to Canada, Wolfgang Behrends; United Nations Secretariat officials, Giandomenico Picco, Carole Thompson, Tapio Kanninen and Timour Dmitrichev; as well as scholars and former diplomats including James Sutterlin, Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye (Ret) and Geoffrey Pearson. (See Appendix B for a complete list of participants.)

The need for the United Nations to play a larger role in war prevention, the nature of international conflict, communication needs and problems of diplomacy were discussed and assessed from a wide range of experience and perspectives.

The summary report that follows addresses four main topics:

(1) the utility, structure and scope of a multilateral war risk reduction centre;

(2) the value, organization and potential problems of a multilateral nuclear alert centre;

(3) the multilateral role in conflicts stemming from societal tensions; and

(4) innovative approaches in the use of UN peacekeeping.

I. THE UTILITY OF A WAR RISK REDUCTION CENTRE IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The present time is propitious for studying how the risk of war can be reduced by multilateral organizations--by the United Nations, in particular--because a) there is growing international understanding that the prevention of regional conflict requires international cooperation; b) there is a greater inclination among the most powerful countries to work together toward this end; and c) there is increased willingness to turn to the Security Council, and to support it in its mandated purpose of maintaining peace. "The time is ripe," as Professor Bloomfield put it, "since negative cost-benefit calculations drive the United States and the Soviet Union toward a more neutral stand on local conflicts."

In considering war risk reduction, certain definitions are useful: A dispute is an argument--a disagreement on a discrete subject--that needs to be resolved before the broader relationship between countries can be improved. A conflict involves military elements--that is, a dispute in which the use, or threat, of force has been injected. War signifies hostilities in which people are killing each other in substantial numbers. It is important to focus the efforts of the United Nations on conflict, its prevention, if possible, and its limitation, if it exists, in order to avoid war. The effectiveness of the United Nations should not be diluted by overloading it with other responsibilities in the security area.

To prevent conflict and reduce the risk of war the United Nations has five requirements: timely information; leverage; mediation capacity; deterrence instrumentalities; and the means, such as peacekeeping forces, to stabilize a conflict situation. No one of these elements alone can prevent or resolve conflict. Even with early and extensive information and outstanding mediation skills, the United Nations Secretary-General can rarely, if ever, resolve a conflict without the leverage that the Security Council can exert. Moreover, the stabilizing effect of a peacekeeping operation is often essential. Thus, the achievement of a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war required the informed mediation skill of the Secretary-General, the leverage of the Permanent Members of the Security Council and the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping

forces as military observers. The objective must be to ensure that all of these elements are available to the United Nations in full measure and at all times.

To improve the availability of current information, as well as background data and substantive analyses on political developments affecting international security, the Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI) has been established within the United Nations Secretariat. This can be an important tool in conflict prevention. The United Nations already has at its disposal adequate mediation capacity in the person of the Secretary-General and in the many skilled individuals on whom he may call. The utilization of the United Nations peacekeeping capacity could be expanded, however, to encompass deterrence as well as stabilization, and to be applicable to maritime areas where, until now, it has not been used.

The mandates of ORCI and the Security Council relate to political conflict between states. That is also the primary area of mediation experience in the United Nations, and the tendency has been to think of the utilization of peacekeeping forces in connection only with this type of conflict, although this has not always been the case. Yet, today's reality is that by far the majority of conflict situations are of a different type, stemming from social or economic tensions, often essentially internal in nature but with important international ramifications. If the United Nations is to deal with this type of conflict, it needs to be able to mobilize the resources of the United Nations system as a whole, including "global watch" information, and to direct those resources for preventive purposes, possibly through a greatly strengthened Economic and Social Council.

All of these objectives and requirements need to be taken into account in considering the utility and organization of a United Nations war risk reduction centre. In the 1970s, there was a tendency to pursue confidence-building largely in the area of arms control and arms limitation. War risk reduction centres can be seen as a broader form of confidence-building.

In Europe, three main approaches to confidence-building have emerged: national alert centres, linked by rapid communication facilities; the two alliance approach in which communication between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be enhanced; and the "hot spots" approach, under which small observation posts would be located in identified sensitive areas and report to a centre whose area of coverage would extend from the

Atlantic to the Urals. These European ideas should be linked to the concept of a United Nations global war risk reduction centre. Confidence-building and conflict-prevention need to be approached from both a regional and a global level.

1. Points of Emphasis

In war risk reduction, communication is vital, not only to bring information and analyses to the Secretary-General and the Security Council, but also to mobilize public attention and official support for the efforts and accomplishments of the United Nations. It is necessary to get the attention of top policymakers before a conflict becomes critical and this often requires the pressure of generated publicity rather than the quiet diplomacy that the United Nations has traditionally preferred.

Given the basic changes in the world situation, it is no longer possible to make a clear distinction between political conflicts and those having economic and social roots. The United Nations needs to be able to deal more effectively with the type of conflict that is likely to be dominant in the coming years. An improved system might require rethinking the Charter restriction on UN intervention in the domestic affairs of a state.

The United Nations needs to pursue three approaches in reducing the risk of war: (1) deterrence for the prevention of conflict; (2) confidence-building measures for limiting conflict escalation; and (3) expert advice for solving the underlying disputes.

The knowledge and counsel available in the academic and institutional communities can be of great assistance to the United Nations in the prevention and resolution of conflict. The mandate of ORCI to serve as a link to these communities is extremely welcome. The formation of an academic advisory group should be considered.

2. Counterpoint

The United Nations system should not be overloaded. It should not be seen as the only qualified mediating body. The purpose of a global watch should not mainly be to search for problems that the United Nations can solve directly but rather to identify problems that should be brought to world public attention.

II. MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR ALERT CENTRES

The case for a multilateral nuclear alert centre rests primarily on the ground that the international system is evolving rapidly towards a multipolar nuclear world. This basic observation was recognized by the Secretary-General in his 1986 Annual Report in which he suggested that a multilateral nuclear alert centre might "reduce the risk of fatal misinterpretation of unintentional nuclear launchings or, in the future, the chilling possibility of isolated launchings by those who may clandestinely gain access to nuclear devices."

In the 1960s Britain and France developed relatively small nuclear arsenals of about 150 warheads each, while China had even fewer. Even at that point, this posed management problems. By the mid-1990s each of these states will have more than one thousand nuclear warheads, thus increasing the significance of their involvement in nuclear alerts or confrontations. They will be joined, moreover, by Israel, with perhaps three hundred warheads, and possibly by other states with significant arsenals. In addition, a number of regional powers, including India, Pakistan, South Africa and Argentina, may well have deployed long-range ballistic missiles.

What are the implications of this situation? First, there will almost certainly be management problems where nuclear alerts affect more than two states. In 1969 China dispersed its nuclear weapons and placed them on strip alert aircraft. If the Soviet Union had gone to a nuclear alert, the United States would surely have followed suit, if only to protect its own forces. In the 1990s, therefore, one can anticipate a range of multilateral nuclear management problems, namely:

* The lesser but now formidable nuclear powers will need highly developed alerting systems to protect their forces. If the Soviet Union goes to an alert status against the United States in the Far East, for example, the Chinese will be bound to follow suit.

* If a nuclear weapon is exploded at sea, there will be three or four nuclear navies involved in the Atlantic and Pacific, and possibly others in other parts of the world. In such cases the detonation of a nuclear device can no longer be considered the signal that the "other side" has started a nuclear war.

* The prospects for controlling a limited nuclear exchange -- avoiding cities, for example -- will be considerably more difficult with several parties.

* Communication problems will increase. In the Cuban missile crisis, for example, problems arose because there were no Russian-speaking officers on US naval vessels. Multinational incidents will make such incidents more likely and more difficult to control.

A Multilateral Nuclear Alert Centre might address these problems at two levels. First, it could develop operational procedures to help manage nuclear crises. Second, like the bilateral hotline, it would constitute recognition that nuclear weapons are different and must be treated in a special manner in the conduct of interstate relations.

In addressing this proposal several key issues emerged as the focus of discussion. First, discussion centred on the circumstances in which multilateral incidents might lead to crises. Here there are clear indications of the potential risks. Four commonly recognized paths to nuclear war appear to be particularly relevant to the multilateral nuclear conflict. Surprise attack may no longer be a central issue between the superpowers, but it could be an important factor in crises involving lesser nuclear powers. Dangers of accidental war increase with the number of nuclear actors, some of whom will lack experience in the command and control of nuclear weapons. Similarly, catalytic war dangers, including the use of nuclear weapons by third parties which might be states or terrorist groups, clearly increase with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Finally, regional conflicts will be heightened by the presence of regional nuclear powers, and bring with them the danger of escalation to involve the superpowers.

Second, a multilateral nuclear risk reduction centre seems particularly appropriate in a regional context, where it is evident that better regional surveillance and warning systems are needed, as well as more emphasis on command and control mechanisms to deal with accidents. The experience of binational electronic cooperative agreements--including perhaps the NORAD Agreement -- may provide useful case studies. However, it is clear that the feasibility of efforts to create regional confidence building and crisis management machinery will vary from situation to situation. In this respect the European example is particularly interesting.

As the locus of superpower rivalry, Europe has slowly developed procedures to deal with both conventional and nuclear crisis management. The Stockholm Agreement of 1988 is intended to reduce the risk of surprise attack, and contains detailed provisions for confidence-building measures. The Vienna negotiations may lead to further confidence-building measures, as well as to significant reductions in troop strengths. The success of these negotiations has led to increased interest in confidence-building centres in Europe, particularly connected with the various proposals for zones in which military activities and equipment would be restricted. In June 1988, for example, the German Democratic Republic proposed the establishment of a centre in central Europe for crisis management and the prevention of activities leading to military confrontation. The proposal included a suggested hotline among Bonn, Berlin and Prague, so combining the proposal for a restricted zone with a risk reduction centre. The East German proposal also recommended a centre for the exchange of military information, an exchange of military attachés, and a permanent satellite monitoring system.

Such proposals are clearly relevant to the question of multilateral nuclear risk reduction centres, but their focus is broader and, in the case of the model discussed above, specific to the European context. Two questions arise. First, can the European example serve for other regions? Second, what should be the role of the United Nations in regionally oriented risk reduction centres?

On the first question, it can be argued that in Europe the use of force for dealing with territorial boundary disputes is all but ruled out by the military stand-off between the blocs and the reluctance of Europeans to countenance further war in Europe. This is not the case in other regions, where the resort to force may be much more likely and the interest in confidence-building measures and military transparency considerably less. Granted that the written and unwritten norms and practices which have developed in Europe have not been developed elsewhere, however, it may be argued that the task for practitioners and analysts is to begin the process of institution building in other regions.

What should be the role of the United Nations? It is evident that certain difficulties face the United Nations in seeking to establish a central role in nuclear risk reduction centres. Nuclear matters are highly classified. It is unlikely, therefore, that nuclear-possessing states would be eager to provide tightly held information to the

United Nations, or perhaps to any multilateral centre. In this regard it was noted that even within NATO it has been a long process to persuade the United States to provide nuclear information to its alliance partners. Once a sequence of nuclear alerts had been initiated, there would be great reluctance to provide information to the UN. This might suggest, therefore, that the critical UN role is at an earlier point in the developing crisis, and particularly in seeking to prevent the escalation to the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the leading example -- Europe -- is one where the development of regional machinery has least involved the United Nations. Paradoxically, the potential for a UN role seems much greater in other regions where there is little experience or commitment to risk reduction centres. Clearly, establishing linkages between the European and other potential regional centres and the United Nations will be critical to the ability of the United Nations to oversee regional arrangements.

Despite these difficulties, it is apparent that there is an emerging need for regional and UN processes to deal with the problems arising specifically from the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since the currently declared nuclear powers are the permanent members of the Security Council, measures to improve the effectiveness of the Council, including possibly a UN-based multilateral nuclear risk reduction centre, will become more pressing as problems of nuclear weapon management become more complex. Similarly, measures are needed to ensure that the Secretary-General has the technical support necessary to strengthen his role in this area. Given the limited experience with such multilateral mechanisms, detailed study of the potential problems and institutional responses is required.

III. THE MULTILATERAL ROLE IN CONFLICTS STEMMING FROM SOCIETAL TENSIONS

Traditionally, the main focus of multilateral efforts to promote international security and peace has been on territorial conflict, disarmament and arms control. A new balance needs to be established with much more attention to tension and conflict arising from economic inequities and social decay, that are primarily internal in nature. International organizations need to observe more closely internal tensions that threaten the very existence of member states and place broader peace in jeopardy. The United Nations and the Organization of American States might, for example, combine efforts in crisis anticipation and the promotion of sustained development. Multilateral intervention should be considered when law and order have broken down, resulting in an internal security vacuum and gross violations of human rights. Responsibility for development assistance for a continent such as Africa should not be delegated solely to the World Bank and the IMF. In some cases regional organizations are better suited for intervention since they do not involve the type of hegemony represented by the Security Council.

It is possible theoretically to identify the following eleven types of intervention:

1. Quiet Talk -- This is applicable where early advice may help to get sides together. Care should be taken not to dramatize or escalate the situation. "Politically irrelevant experts like academicians" can be useful.

2. Situational Fix -- In this technique, an organization or group of countries can provide resources in order to placate one or both opponents.

3. Care for Victims -- Multilateral or unilateral donors provide internal assistance to the victims of the conflict.

4. Separation of the Parties -- A multilateral organization is required, either the United Nations or a regional body with a peacekeeping capacity.

5. Collective Denunciation -- The General Assembly and the Security Council can publicly "embarrass" the guilty party, where identifiable, and mobilize public opinion and governmental opposition.

6. Sanctions -- A multilateral task for the Security Council.

7. Armed Intervention -- While this may, in future, take the form of peace-keeping, it would be properly a multilateral task to be undertaken by the Security Council.

8. Partisan Support -- Support can be extended to one side in a conflict by a regional organization or bilaterally.

9. Holding the Ring -- Isolating the conflict from the involvement of external powers. Regional organizations are best suited to obtain this objective although their record is not impressive.

10. Damage Limitation -- This includes countering damage to neighbouring countries. Regional efforts are likely to be most effective, although resources are often required that regional powers do not have.

11. Ratification of Solution -- Multilateral endorsement of the termination of the conflict is necessary with multilateral guarantees to deprive the loser of hope of reversing the agreement.

There should be flexibility in the use of private groups, regional organizations or the United Nations in intervention depending on the circumstances in each case. Non-governmental organizations can also play a useful role.

Intervention in internal strife inevitably raises the question of national sovereignty. However, in accepting international codes and regimes as, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the CSCE Final Act, the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, states have recognized that it is in their interest to share responsibility and, to a certain extent, to limit sovereignty. An early warning system for societal tensions

would be required if the United Nations were to be effective in alleviating internal conflict. This, too, could be extremely sensitive from the point of view of member states, but unclassified information, such as ORCI relies on in the political field, could be sufficient. With facts in hand, the Secretary-General could exercise quiet preventive diplomacy and indicate what the United Nations could do, if the parties desired, to resolve the crisis.

1. Point of Emphasis

If it is to reduce the risk of war, whether in the circumstances of international or internal disputes, the United Nations needs a much better institutional memory than it has. This is especially important if emphasis is to be shifted from crisis operations to crisis prevention. The role of the United Nations in internal conflicts is not new. In contemplating what is possible and desirable in the future, an awareness of what was done in the past and how it was done is essential. The utilization of computers to record and retrieve past experience is feasible and should be undertaken.

2. Counterpoint

The resources of the United Nations are limited. It cannot get involved in all current or potential conflict situations. Priorities need to be established. United Nations efforts should be concentrated on conflicts that pose the greatest threat to international peace even though there may be moral reasons for involvement in less internationally threatening situations.

IV. INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO PEACEKEEPING

In assessing the need for improved methods of peacekeeping, it is important to recognize the limited scope of peacekeeping activities to date. In general, peacekeeping forces have been deployed in support of a frequently fragile ceasefire or truce agreement. Peacekeeping has stood in contrast to peacemaking, and sometimes been criticized for sustaining a stalemated conflict rather than facilitating a resolution. Further, it is evident that peacekeeping has been useful in the termination of conflict but not in its prevention. As the Secretary-General commented in 1987, "as essential as peacekeeping can be, it is no substitute for preventing armed conflict. Indeed, the serious crises addressed this past year -- many of which are long-standing -- point to the need to take timely and effective multilateral action before problems reach crisis proportions."

This general view is reinforced, moreover, by the expectation that regional and local conflicts will increasingly dominate the agenda of the United Nations. The improved climate in East-West relations is gratifying, bringing as it does the prospect that in Europe reductions in nuclear and conventional forces will be accompanied by a range of arms control and confidence-building measures. In sharp contrast, the scope for conflict elsewhere seems to be increasing. In addition to a range of traditional interstate rivalries, territorial disputes and colonial vestiges, other sources of conflict are emerging. Economic decay and acute underdevelopment have produced widespread misery in the third world. Food shortages, population migrations and waves of refugees may also pose threats to domestic order, to the survival of states, and to regional and international security.

In these circumstances, it seems appropriate to explore a renewed approach to peacekeeping by focussing first on preventive activities. Initially, this might involve greater emphasis on the support mechanisms necessary to strengthen the role of the Secretary-General and the Security Council. Within the present structure of the United Nations, for example, emphasis might be placed on integrating the information and analysis generated by different groups. Analysis of economic and social developments could be coordinated with the efforts of an enhanced peacekeeping staff to plan and administer expanded peacekeeping operations. The Office of Research and Collection of Information (ORCI) might be developed to serve as a global watch centre with a mandate

to inform the Secretary-General and the Security Council of impending threats to the peace.

With appropriate support mechanisms, attention might then be directed towards a greater emphasis on preventive peacekeeping. In principle, peacekeeping could be directed towards the dangers of crisis escalation within a country, as well as to threats of external aggression. This implies that social and economic crisis, and not just the collapse of political order, would come under the purview of peacekeeping. The Congo provides an interesting precedent. Although commonly regarded as an example of the United Nations overreaching itself, it might also provide lessons on the prerequisites for successful UN action to support domestic order and prevent violent internal conflict.

1. Naval Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping at sea emerged as a plausible crisis control mechanism most recently in the Persian Gulf in 1987. In a situation where the United States had committed itself to safe passage for cargoes bound for Kuwait, Washington saw little choice other than to protect merchant ships by reflagging them before they entered the Gulf, and then providing armed escort into port. Thereafter, US naval vessels found themselves in sporadic confrontations with the belligerents in the Gulf, culminating in the incident in which the USS Vincennes accidentally shot down a civilian airliner while under attack from Iranian speedboats.

Proponents of a UN naval force argued that the reflagging exercise might have been better done by the United Nations. Drawing on international respect for the impartiality of UN forces, it was suggested, merchant ships could have flown the UN flag and been accompanied by small, unarmed UN patrol boats. They would have been subject to UN inspection to ensure that they were not carrying military goods for use in the war zone. As with current peacekeeping activities, the action would have been authorized by the Security Council and, therefore, conducted with the support of the major naval powers operating in the Gulf.

At first sight it might appear that the situation described above was unique, with little expectation that similar situations might develop in the future. In principle, this is not so: the Convention on the Law of the Sea, for example, contains provisions which

may require monitoring and supervision by the United Nations. More specifically, there are other cases which suggest that naval peacekeeping may be important in the future. In the Falklands, for example, negotiations at the United Nations centred in part on the proposal that the naval forces of Britain and Argentina stand off from a demarcation zone. Such a demarcation would have required monitoring by an international force which, in turn, would have needed a naval presence.

The UN has no experience in such tasks, and these types of incidents may well recur. Analyzing the requirements and procedures involved in naval peacekeeping, therefore, would be an important element in a broad approach to strengthening the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. In the Gulf, a UN naval presence would have performed two primary functions: keeping the waterway open under international guarantees, and escorting merchant vessels. In a broader range of tasks, a UN naval force might also be required to conduct inspections in support of embargoes or ceasefire agreements. It might also undertake to supervise the clearing of mines from waterways, to show the UN flag as a deterrent to possible naval conflict, and, in more ambitious actions, to enforce blockades and project force.

2. The Secretary-General and the Security Council

In an expanded approach to peacekeeping, new obligations would fall on the United Nations. Financial arrangements would need to be improved. New training, improved field communications and a variety of remote sensing techniques should be considered. Such developments would place particular responsibility on the Secretary-General and the Security Council. They would underline the importance of frequent, confidential meetings between the Secretary-General and the Council to review international developments. Particularly in the light of recent declarations by the Soviet Union indicating broad support for peacekeeping operations, the Security Council may now be in a position to take a more vigorous, pro-active role in peacekeeping operations. To support its activities, a plausible approach may be to consider the reactivation of the Military Staff Committee or a functional equivalent. Since the enhancement of peacekeeping will require the support of all the permanent members, a revived Military Staff Committee, which was originally predicated on the assumption that the great powers would be able to act in concert, may be an important test of the Council's ability to operate effectively in the peacekeeping field.

CONCLUSIONS

The Kingston conference ranged widely over a variety of issues pertaining to the central role of the United Nations in multilateral approaches to war risk reduction. At the conclusion four subjects were selected for more detailed examination: the modalities involved in developing a multilateral risk reduction centre; further inquiry into the implications of an expanding multipolar nuclear world and the technical questions involved in creating a multilateral nuclear alert centre; the societal sources of conflict and the prospects of using international influence to alleviate such conflict; and an expanded approach to international peacekeeping.

Insofar as the Kingston conference brought together UN officials, diplomats and academics, it also reflected the belief that this combination of expertise should be brought together again to consider how best to support the United Nations as it moves towards its future role in reducing the risk of war.

APPENDIX A

FROM CRISIS TO PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Vladimir Petrovsky, USSR Foreign Minister

Kingston, Ontario, 7 October 1988

A turn towards the curing of crisis and conflict situations, which for a long time have plagued some areas of the globe, is becoming a distinct feature of the present international political scene.

The United Nations takes an active part in this process. The growing responsibility of the United Nations and particularly its Security Council and Secretary-General is seen everywhere -- in the Afghanistan settlement which is of key importance for triggering a developing chain reaction of resolving regional conflicts, as well as in the Iran-Iraq, Namibia, Middle-East and Western Sahara situations. Multilateralism has proved in practice to be much more productive than egocentric isonationalist alternatives.

All these developments are the implementation of the idea of comprehensive common security, which means the solution of problems by political means on the basis of balance of interest. Its structure is based on the UN Charter and is part and parcel of an enhanced, more effective role for the organization. The creation of comprehensive security is not one action; it is a long process of adapting the United Nations and the behaviour of member states to the realities of an interdependent world. For this purpose, a fresh outlook is needed. The new approach to the United Nations that we are advocating today is the rejection of any policies which treat the UN as an instrument of national interest. In the world today, the UN should play the role of an international centre for harmonizing and balancing the interests of its member states. This demands from member states the critical reappraisal of their own behavior in this organization, the readiness for dialogue, the yielding of some national rights to the UN. In other words, what is needed today is an intellectual policy, the lack of which has been felt very often. As I see the establishment of comprehensive security, the process should lead not only to the settlement of all existing conflicts, but to the prevention of new ones.

This is imperative in an interdependent and increasingly integrated world, too fragile for wars and violence. Its future is unthinkable without enhancing the quality and efficiency of the existing mechanism for preventing conflicts and without establishing, where necessary, new ones. In other words, implementation of the concept of comprehensive security means moving away from crisis to preventive diplomacy, with the United Nations playing the central role.

Crisis prevention, like security itself, calls for a comprehensive approach covering not only politico-military but also economic, ecological, human rights and other humanitarian spheres. All those spheres can and should have a kind of reliable early warning system to signal emerging problems which will make it possible to take, in good time, necessary measures to ensure stability of the international processes.

In our view, the growing international dialogue on comprehensive security at the intergovernmental and public levels has revealed a real possibility to concentrate now on three areas contributing to the immunization of the world community from disputes and conflicts, and its greater ability to take actual preventive measures. These areas include establishing the rule of international law, the greater effectiveness of the main bodies of the United Nations, and better use of the UN military observers and peacekeeping forces.

In this respect, making use of the preventive potential of the UN principal bodies is of special importance.

We expect the UN General Assembly session currently being held in New York to adopt by consensus a jointly elaborated declaration on preventing and resolving disputes and situations which endanger peace and security and on the UN role in the field. The document is aimed at revitalizing the preventive actions of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Secretary-General.

The report of the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, on the work of the organization in 1988, clearly states the line towards activating the entire UN mechanism, which, inter alia, in the sphere of preventive diplomacy has generated general satisfaction at the session.

Detailed proposals on enhancing the UN role, including its peacekeeping operations, were made at the session by the Soviet Union, primarily in the statement by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, and also in the working documents of our delegation. What we propose is a set of measures to increase substantially the peacemaking, peacekeeping and preventive potential of the United Nations.

We suggest specific approaches to enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council, ranging from a wider use of informal consultations and closed meetings to regular meetings of the Foreign Ministers Summit. We also take a fresh view of the functions of the General Assembly which should be a forum for a serious and democratic exchange of ideas in search, above all, of consensus approaches and solutions rather than a body for comparing opposite positions, ostentatious declarations and empty rhetoric. We also stand for the further strengthening of the Secretary-General's role and the full use, by him, of his powers.

It is our view that in order to resolve the problems of conflict prevention in practical terms and to identify in good time dangerous spots in international politico-military and socio-economic relations, it is necessary, first of all, to have an objective picture of events. Consequently, the information-gathering function of the United Nations should be radically improved, including fact verification and investigation missions. The very existence of this potential in the organization will encourage restraint and contribute to greater stability.

It is particularly important to find out in time about preparations for armed actions and to work out measures making a surprise attack difficult. This purpose is also served by the Soviet proposal to the United Nations to establish under the UN Secretary-General a multilateral verification centre to facilitate monitoring. It would send, on short notice, fact-finding missions to areas of international conflicts at the request of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General would, on the basis of these mission reports, hold consultations with appropriate states and use his right to involve the Security Council.

Finland's proposal on setting up a UN data bank to store disarmament- and verification-related information serves the same purpose. We are ready to consider positively the question of providing this bank with some information coming from Soviet

commercial satellites. We also consider promising the idea of France establishing an international monitoring satellite agency, and we are prepared to discuss appropriate measures in practical terms.

Reality makes us see the UN peacekeeping operations in a new light. The recent decision to award the Nobel Prize to these operations emphasizes once again an urgent need to build on their positive experience and strengthen their political and legal foundations, which is also important for crisis prevention.

In his message of congratulations to the UN Secretary-General on the occasion of the Nobel Prize Committee's decision, Mikhail Gorbachev noted that it reflects the recognition of an important role played by the UN peacekeeping forces in ensuring peace in various areas of the globe. The Soviet leader stressed that the USSR will continue to provide utmost support for the strengthening of the peacekeeping potential of the United Nations and the enhancement of its practical contribution to the maintenance of durable peace and universal security.

The Geneva Accord on Afghanistan monitored by UN observers serves both as an example and the starting point for regional conflict settlement efforts. This increases the responsibility of all sides for strict compliance with the balance of obligations contained in the accord. Proceeding from the urgency of the problem, we not only support the UN observers engaging the support of the control mechanism envisaged in Geneva but are convinced of the need to upgrade the quality and enhance the effectiveness of their activities.

Effectiveness of the UN observers team in Afghanistan and Pakistan becomes even more important as there are plans for new UN operations, in particular in Namibia and Western Sahara. The prestige of international peacekeepers must be on par with the responsibility of their mission.

We highly appreciate the role of states, including Canada, which assign their troops to UN forces and provide financial and material support for them. Quite a few young Canadians and those of other nationalities wear with honour the blue helmets of the United Nations. They deserve our deepest respect and gratitude. Their courage and commitment to their duty are essential and will be even more essential for the world to

become better. In addition to peacekeeping in areas of existing tensions, the UN operations could be conducted also for the purpose of precluding and preventing emerging conflicts. To this aim the Security Council could set up observation points in explosive areas.

The UN preventive functions would also be enhanced if missions were sent to safeguard member states against external interference. In such cases, the UN personnel could be sent at the request of only one side to be stationed in its territory. It would also be useful to send special missions comprised of governmental officials and public figures to evaluate the situation on the spot and elaborate recommendations.

We are ready to be flexible in adopting decisions on the sending of observers and in broadening the participation of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General in the process, obviously with the appropriate role played by the Security Council.

The Soviet Union takes a fresh look at the possibilities of its engagement in UN operations. We stand ready to take part, on a mutual basis with other countries, in the establishment of a system to train personnel for service in UN forces. In some cases, if there is such a need and interest on the part of other UN member states, we would be ready to consider assigning our military contingent to UN peacekeeping operations. The Soviet Union could contribute to the material and technical support of UN forces.

We can accept various options for financing such operations. What matters here is their usefulness, and regard for the interests and positions of the majority of the UN member states.

In practical terms, we could discuss even today, the question of creating UN naval forces, in particular for the Gulf area. It is also imperative to reverse the current stagnation of the military staff committee. The establishment of various centres to prevent military clashes and surprise attack could become an effective form of preventive diplomacy.

There already exists war risk reduction centres such as the Soviet-American one. These centres could, in the future, play an important role in regions where military confrontation is particularly high--for example, in Europe. If the idea of creating a

European centre, a sort of collective body for considering and adopting measures, were realized, it would promote greater predictability and stability on the continent and the removal of sources of friction and misunderstandings between countries on military questions.

Specific activities of the centre would be carried out taking into account the mechanisms and forms that have been tested in the implementation of agreements provided for in the document of the Stockholm Conference and in the activities of the Soviet and US nuclear risk reduction centre.

We fully support the idea of the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the creation of multilateral war risk reduction centre. The discussion here in Kingston shows that this idea is ripe for its realization. There is an organizational structure in the UN Secretariat which could serve as a basis for this centre. Of course, certain practical issues need to be clarified. It seems to me that the most preferable solution would be to have a war risk reduction centre which deals with prevention both of the nuclear and conventional wars. Nuclear alert could become part of its function. It is very important that this centre should have direct lines of communications with the capitals of the five permanent members of the Security Council, as well as with the capital of the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Obviously, more active peacekeeping and, in particular, the preventive activities of the United Nations operations, oblige the UN and its member states to solve a number of larger scale organizational and financial tasks. Under these conditions, full compliance by all member states with their financial commitments to the organization is of fundamental importance. The Soviet Union is known to have acted precisely in this manner as it has completely cleared its debt under the regular budget. The UN is entitled to expect that its other members would act likewise and that President Reagan's encouraging statement to that effect would materialize.

Ensuring a solid financial base for the United Nations requires new efforts to economize and a search for internal reserves in this area. We need to put the whole UN house in order, to reduce paperwork and unexpected expenditures. We support efforts in this area and are prepared to further participate in the joint work to rehabilitate the United Nations not only in political but in administrative and financial terms as well.

Turning the United Nations and other mechanisms to preventive diplomacy is an urgent matter. Failure to do so would make it difficult to count on the rule of law, common sense and morality in international affairs. The Soviet Union regards a resolute transition away from crisis diplomacy to preventive diplomacy as a most important means of implementing the changeover from a balance of power to a balance of interests and the rule of law in international relations. We regard this as the key to common comprehensive security. The United Nations is inconceivable without such security. Likewise, common security means a stronger UN role. That role places the United Nations in a unique position in the future to practice preventive international therapy rather than to operate on critical cases.

APPENDIX B

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CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

7 October 1988

09 00 h	Opening Session
Organization of Conference	**David Cox** Queen's University
Topical Introduction	**Bruce M. Russett** Coordinator, Yale Program for International Security and Arms Control
10 00 h to 10 15 h	Coffee

Session I

10 15 h to 12 15 h	Utility, structure and scope of a Multilateral War Risk Reduction Centre
	Moderator: **Lincoln Bloomfield**
	Discussants: **Krystof Ostrowski** **Tapio Kanninen** **James S. Sutterlin**
	Rapporteur: **Jean Krasno**
12 30 h to 14 00 h	Lunch
	Speaker: **William Barton**

Session II

14 30 h to 16 30 h	The value, organization and potential problems of a Multilateral Nuclear Alert Centre
	Moderator: **Paul Bracken**
	Discussants: **Wolfgang Behrends** **Fen Hampson** **Wilhelm Grundmann**
	Rapporteur: **Jane Boulden**
16 30 h 18 00 h	Free time for informal discussions
18 15 h 20 00 h	Dinner
	Speaker: **Vladimir Petrovsky**

Session III

20 15 h to 21 30 h — Improved communication facilities for reducing the risk of war and limiting conflict situations

Moderator: Carole Thompson

Discussants: Indar Jit Rikhye
Giandomenico Picco
Thomas Boudreau

Rapporteur: Jane Boulden

8 October 1988

Session IV

09 00 h to 10 45 h — Innovative utilization of the United Nations peacekeeping capacity

Moderator: Bruce Russett

Discussants: Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse
Ed Luck
Jerome Paolini

Rapporteur: James Tierney

10 45 h to 11 00 h — Coffee

Session V

11 00 h to 12 45 h — The role of multilateral organizations in dealing with conflicts stemming from social or domestic political tensions

Moderator: William Foltz

Discussants: Ibrahim Gambari
Hayward Alker

Rapporteur: Jean Krasno

13 00 h to 14 30 h — Lunch

Speaker: Bruce Russett

15 00 h to 17 00 h	**Closing Session**
	Presentation of summaries of conclusions emerging from working sessions and discussion for incorporation in conference report
	Moderators: **Raymo Väyrynen** **David Cox**
	Discussion of next stage of war risk reduction project
	Closing remarks by Geoffrey Pearson
18 00 h to 20 00 h	**Informal dinner**
20 00 h to 21 30 h	**Discussion Session on: Iran-Iraq and the Falkland Islands: The United Nations role in two regional conflicts**
	Moderator: **Harald von Riekhoff**
	Discussants: **Giandomenico Picco** **Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse**